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1 Introduction 
In ageing societies it is not simply access to long-term care (LTC) that is important, but also its safety, 
effectiveness and responsiveness. This is not least because good quality LTC should help to maintain 
the health and functional status of people for longer, but also because poor quality care can cause 
serious harm and has the potential to be life-threatening.   Indeed, concerns around the quality of 
LTC services are the second highest priority area for LTC reform across OECD countries, just behind 
the fiscal and financial sustainability of LTC systems (Colombo et al. 2011).  
The political debates about ensuring the quality of LTC services are largely driven by three issues.  
First, scandals around abuse and neglect arise frequently enough across OECD countries to ensure 
safety is a relatively constant political concern. Second, the effectiveness of LTC is of interest since 
OECD countries tend to invest a significant amount of public resources in LTC (Colombo et al. 2011).  
Politicians are accountable to the public and need to demonstrate the value of these services to 
show that taxpayers’ money has been spent wisely.  Third, the responsiveness of services to their 
users is a concern – an issue that is linked to the lack of both information about the quality of 
providers’ services and incentives to develop services that are right for users rather than easy for 
providers to deliver.  Despite underlying similarities in problems experienced a variety of policy 
solutions are found across countries to promote quality.  
The aim of this chapter is to describe and compare the policy instruments and approaches used by 
selected OECD countries to promote the quality of LTC services.  Since the way in which each country 
promotes quality is inextricably linked with the overall design and features of the system, we have 
chosen to illustrate the policy options using six countries -- Australia, Austria, England, Finland, Japan 
and the United States of America (USA) -- whose LTC systems differ on a variety of characteristics.  
These countries cover several continents and vary according to the degree to which the management 
of different aspects of the LTC system is centralised or decentralised, how the system is financed, the 
4 
 
eligibility criteria and the make-up of the LTC market in terms of private and public provision as 
shown in Table 1.   
Table 1:  Characteristics of national LTC systems 
 Australia Austria England  Finland Japan United States  
Degree of 
centralisation 
(policy, 
funding, 
provision) 
Mainly 
centralised 
Mixed 
 
Mixed Mainly 
decentralised 
Mixed Mixed 
Source of 
financing 
Tax-based Tax-based Tax-based Tax-based 50% 
contributions;  
50% government  
Tax-based 
  
Eligibility 
criteria 
Universal  Universal LTC 
allowance; 
public support 
for LTC services 
means-tested 
 
Public support 
for LTC means-
tested; universal 
nursing care; 
universal 
benefits for 
disability  
Universal 
coverage within 
a single system 
Universal 
coverage within 
a single 
insurance system 
Public support 
for LTC means-
tested 
(Medicaid); 
universal for 
seniors 
(Medicare) 
Type of 
providers  
Mainly private, 
not-for-profit 
 
Mixed, with 
private mainly 
not-for-profit 
Mixed, mainly 
private, for-profit 
Predominantly 
public, with 
private mainly 
not-for-profit 
Mixed, with for-
profit providers  
Mainly private-
for-profit 
 
Adapted from Colombo et al (2011) 
In discussing efforts to promote LTC quality in these six countries, we draw heavily on a number of 
recent publications.  These include Wiener et al’s (2007) study on approaches to quality 
improvement; the country chapters1 included in Mor et al’s  (2014) book on regulation and quality 
assurance and the country reports from a special edition of EuroHealth on LTC quality2.  We also 
                                                             
1
 Australia (Gray et al. 2014) , Japan (Ikegami et al. 2014), Austria (Leichsenring et al. 2014a) , England (Malley 
et al. 2014)  and the USA (Stevenson and Bramson 2014)   
2
 Austria  (Trukeschitz 2010), England (Malley 2010), Finland (Finne-Soveri et al. 2010) and the USA (Mor 2010)  
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make use of outputs from two Europe-wide research projects: the ANCIEN (Assessing Needs of Care 
in European Nations)3 and the Interlinks4 projects.   
The chapter is organised as follows. The notion of quality in LTC can be understood and positioned in 
a number of different ways, so in section 2 we briefly set out the critical issues.  Section 3 describes 
and maps the different instruments in place in the six OECD countries using a conceptual framework 
for evaluating policy instruments.  We then discuss in section 4 the success and failure of these 
instruments, drawing on general economic and management theory, as well as evidence from 
implementing interventions within different LTC systems.  The chapter concludes with observations 
and recommendations for future policy development in this area. 
2 What is quality in long-term care services? 
In defining the quality of LTC, it is useful to start with the carer-cared for relationship, which 
constitutes the basic caregiving unit.  Understanding the nature of this relationship is critical to 
developing relevant measures of quality for LTC.  Additionally, by focusing on the carer-cared for 
relationship we can usefully exclude aspects such as equity, efficiency and accessibility from our 
definition of quality since these only make sense at the aggregate service or system level, and may 
therefore be more usefully understood as aspects of performance (Reerink 1990).   
Considering the nature of the care relationship, it is important to recognise that although some users 
of LTC may require specialist equipment and medical expertise, most care consists of help with 
activities related to daily living.  Since most care is help with daily living, care is ongoing and is a 
prominent feature of the cared for person’s everyday experience.  Many of the activities are intimate 
tasks such as washing and dressing which require close collaboration between the carer and cared-
for person, such that the ‘consumer’ of care is said to ‘co-produce’ his/her own care, even more than 
                                                             
3
 Austria (Czypionka et al. 2012), Finland (Böckerman et al. 2011) and overviews of European countries (Dandi 
2012; Dandi et al. 2012) 
4
 Finland (Hammar et al. 2010) 
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is the case for health care.  These characteristics have two corollaries for developing relevant 
measures of LTC quality.  First, measures of the quality of care need to reflect its relational and 
experiential character.  This means that non-clinical aspects and aspects related to the process of 
caregiving, such as the behaviour of carers, the responsiveness of services and the cared-for person’s 
quality of life, are just as important as clinical characteristics, such as the incidence of pressures sores 
or use of restraints, and end results (Malley and Fernández 2010).  Second, the quality of care is not 
solely influenced by the care provider. Self-care abilities and the commitment of the care recipient 
also determine processes and outcomes (Trukeschitz 2011).  
There are various frameworks for measuring LTC quality (for a review see Murakami and Colombo 
2013b), which broadly fall into two approaches.  Perhaps the best-known is the production process 
approach forwarded by Donabedian (1988), which distinguishes structural (input) from process and 
outcome indicators.  Structural measures focus on aspects of the care environment, such as staff-to-
patient ratios and room size, and do not capture the quality of the caring activity.  By contrast, 
process measures focus on the way care is delivered and outcome measures on the results or impact 
of caring.  Another approach, which is common among frameworks developed and adopted by 
policymakers, focuses on dimensions of quality, selecting those that have the greatest policy 
relevance.  A good example of this is the OECD framework, which distinguishes (clinical) effectiveness 
and safety, patient-centeredness (including the experience of care), and care co-ordination and 
integration (Murakami and Colombo 2013b)5.  While frameworks help to conceptualise quality for 
measurement, developing appropriate measures of quality, particularly those reflecting processes 
and outcomes, is far from straightforward.  Measurement is plagued by barriers to data capture, 
reporting errors, and attribution of the effect of care.  Although arcane, we must grapple with these 
issues since measurement and assessment is a central element of any quality promotion strategy. 
                                                             
5
 In fact the OECD framework goes further melding the dimensions with the production process approach to 
identify key inputs (workforce, living environment and technologies) that the authors regard as ‘instrumental 
for good care’ (Murakami and Colombo 2013b: 48). 
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3 Types of policy instruments to promote good quality LTC services 
Instruments to promote good quality LTC might do so directly by addressing specific quality-related 
concerns, or they might aim to influence quality in a more indirect way by matching needs to 
resources through assessment or redesigning (parts of) the LTC system. System-level redesigns, such 
as the introduction of consumer-directed care or marketisation, intend to change allocative and/or 
distributive LTC outcomes in general – the promotion of quality might be one of many goals. In this 
section, however, we focus on the description and analysis of instruments designed to directly affect 
LTC quality.  
We describe these instruments in terms of two dimensions: the type of intervention and the 
implementation characteristics.  Following Bemelmans-Videc (1998), we group them as one of three 
types: regulatory, economic or information-based instruments. In a more visual language, 
Bemelmans-Videc speaks of “sticks” (regulation), “carrots” (economic means) and “sermons” 
(information) to characterise the underlying aims of these interventions. By implementation 
characteristics, we refer to both the direction of implementation (‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’) 
and the binding force of an instrument (‘high’ or ‘low’).  Highlighting the direction of implementation 
and binding force helps to demonstrate the fact that not all instruments are developed by 
Government (‘top-down’) or consist solely of mandatory requirements (‘high’ binding force).  As we 
show some are in fact developed by providers or by external stakeholder groups (‘bottom-up’). 
3.1 Regulatory instruments 
Regulatory instruments influence actors “by means of formulated rules and directives which 
mandate receivers to act in accordance with what is ordered in these rules and directives” 
(Bemelmans-Videc 1998: 10). According to Bemelmans-Videc, the defining property of regulation is 
an authoritative relationship. Most regulation of LTC services gains its authority through legislation 
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and there are generally powers (sometimes delegated to arms-length bodies6) to enforce compliance 
with the regulations.  While such regulations are by definition implemented in a top-down fashion 
and have high binding force, regulation can also be implemented from the bottom-up or entered into 
voluntarily, through self-regulation.  Commitments from self-regulation can be strong but by 
definition are not enforced by law. 
The variation in regulatory instruments across six OECD countries is shown in Table 2, according to 
the implementation characteristics and three core elements of regulatory instruments described by 
Hood et al (1999).  The first element is a method for setting standards, which we refer to as 
directions.  Directions are designed to influence different parts of the production process.  While the 
USA has a mix of structure-, process- and outcome-focused standards, Austrian and Japanese 
standards assess mainly structural aspects of quality, such as workforce requirements (e.g. 
qualifications and staffing ratios), the living environment (e.g. room size) and care technologies (such 
as care plans).  By contrast, in Australia and England, standards focus on ‘outcomes’, although often 
these standards actually describe processes, such as plans and protocols, and may differ somewhat 
from an academic understanding of outcomes (Productivity Commission 2011; Malley et al. 2014).  
The second element of regulatory instruments is a method of surveillance for detecting compliance 
with the directions.  England, Australia, the USA and Austria use inspections, which involve on-site 
observation and frequently interviews with service users, relatives and staff, to uncover instances of 
noncompliance.  By contrast, Japan and Finland use inspections primarily to follow up complaints and 
not as a form of surveillance. Instead both countries have ‘desk-based’ approaches to surveillance: 
Japan relies on auditing and Finland on performance reviews to survey quality.  Data is gathered from 
records and documentary evidence, including forms of self-assessment; there are no site visits. 
A method for enforcing compliance, should instances of noncompliance be detected, is the third 
element of regulation.  Australia, England and the USA have a range of sanctions of varying severity 
                                                             
6
 Arms-length bodies are administrative bodies that are not formally part of any government department, but 
are subject to ministerial direction and are usually financed by government. 
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to apply to providers that fail to meet standards.  At the lower end are remedial action plans; while 
penalties, such as fines and termination of business, are reserved for more extreme cases or 
repeated failure to comply with standards.  The range of sanctions is less diverse in Austria, Japan 
and Finland.  However, in practice, there are often differences between what is available, the 
intentions of the system and the extent to which sanctions are used. Thus despite the range of 
available sanctions the Australian regulator operates more at the remedial end, trying to work with 
providers to find solutions, reflecting the dual orientation of the regulator towards assuring safety 
and quality improvement.  By contrast in the USA, although the regulator is focused more on 
identifying and reporting noncompliance, sanctions are rarely applied in practice (Braithwaite et al. 
2007).  
Although the binding force of regulatory instruments is generally high and implementation top-
down, there are examples where the character of regulation is more voluntary.  This is particularly 
the case in Austria and Finland where the setting and implementation of regulations is devolved to 
lower levels of administration. In Finland, for example, there are national guidelines for standards 
and surveillance, but municipalities have a high degree of autonomy in how they are implemented 
within their own quality management systems, so guidelines at the national level have little force.  
Self-regulation is also common, with many countries having quite high usage of voluntary 
accreditation and certification schemes. These include the International Standards Organisation (ISO) 
system, and national schemes such as the National Quality Certification (NQC) which is popular in 
Austrian residential care and the Joint Commission Accreditation Programme in the USA. Additionally 
in Austria, as an example of bottom-up self-regulation, the main LTC non-profit providers have a 
document of understanding about the quality of domiciliary care services, which is a self-binding 
agreement.       
The design variations discussed are illustrated in Table 2, but countries also differ in the target of the 
regulations.  Thus the regulated entity in England and Australia is the provider; Japan and the USA 
focus on both providers and the workforce; and in Finland and Austria the workforce is regulated.  
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Regulation in all countries, except England, is much more developed for residential (and in particular 
nursing) homes.  While many countries have directions and surveillance for home care agencies, 
standards are usually fewer and surveillance activity less frequent. It is only in England where home 
care agencies are subject to the same standards, surveillance and enforcement regime as care 
homes.  However, countries are often aware of this difference in the intensity of regulation of 
residential and home care and, for example, recent legislation in Australia has narrowed the gap 
between the two regimes (Department of Social Services 2013).   
Table 2: Summary of the forms of regulatory interventions to promote quality LTC services across selected OECD 
countries 
Direction of implementation      Top-down Bottom-up 
                                        Binding force 
 
Type of intervention 
High Low High/low 
 
Directions for LTC, providers, the workforce, 
or the rights of users and dependent people 
e.g. standards, targets, codes of conduct, 
charters 
AUS, AUT, ENG, 
FIN, JPN, USA 
AUT, FIN, JPN, USA 
(accreditation & 
certification) 
 
AUT 
Modes and rules for surveillance of 
commissioners, providers or the workforce  
e.g. inspection, audit, review 
AUS, AUT, ENG, 
FIN, JPN, USA 
 
AUT, FIN, JPN, USA 
(accreditation & 
certification)  
 
 
Rules and powers for enforcement of 
directions 
AUS, AUT, ENG, 
FIN, JPN, USA 
 
  
Key: AUS Australia, AUT Austria,  ENG England, FIN Finland, JPN Japan, USA America 
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3.2 Economic instruments 
Economic instruments set incentives or disincentives to induce actors to change their behaviour. 
Although most economic instruments aim to incentivise more efficient LTC provision, some are 
specifically designed to promote LTC quality. These economic instruments comprise at least two 
types of interventions. First, financial incentives, such as quality-related subsidies or reimbursement 
systems, reward providers for extra efforts in promoting quality. Second, economic incentives are 
used to increase competition based on the quality of LTC through, for example, setting quality-
related criteria for selection of providers for public procurement. The expectation behind this policy 
is that market forces will lead to better performance and thus to higher quality LTC.   
Financial incentives to improve LTC quality can be grouped into (i) quality-related subsidies, (ii) 
quality-related payment schemes or price regulation and (iii) quality-related procurement modes 
(see table 3). More generic approaches tie the eligibility of providers for public funding to the 
adoption of quality management systems. LTC providers need to implement at least some quality 
monitoring and quality improvement strategies to qualify for public funding, e.g. in Austria. On the 
other hand more sophisticated incentives reward providers for specific behaviour that is supposed to 
lead to LTC quality improvements such as their investment in staffing levels or in skill development. 
Across our six OECD countries different types of financial instruments are in place to incentivise 
providers to invest in such quality improvements. 
Quality-related subsidies can be found, for example, in England. Providers investing in staff can apply 
for workforce development funds from an independent organisation, Skills for Care, which receives 
funding from government to develop a better skilled care workforce. These funds are accessible to all 
eligible providers as they are not linked to a particular funding mode or provider-purchaser 
relationship. 
Quality-related reimbursement intends to influence either the standards of staffing in particular or 
more generally the characteristics of LTC service provision. Examples in the first group of quality-
12 
 
related reimbursements can be found in Japan and Australia. In Japan, additional reimbursement is 
available for providers that exceed the minimum standards of staffing in nursing homes. In Australia, 
the “Conditional Adjustment Payment” (CAP) encourages providers of residential care to improve 
corporate governance and financial management practices. The basic public reimbursement per 
resident is topped up (CAP) if workforce reforms are implemented (Department of Social Services 
2013). The second type of quality-related reimbursement seeks to tie public means to certain LTC 
service characteristics. Different types of pay-for-performance (P4P) exist with the goal of 
encouraging ongoing improvements and rewarding high quality care. P4P is comparatively well-
developed in Australia for care home and home care services. It is increasingly used in some parts of 
the USA and England, primarily in the care home sector. In England, both the criteria for a quality 
premium over and above the basic fee and the level of this premium vary between the local councils. 
Similar variations in programme characteristics are found across states in the USA (Briesacher et al. 
2009; Werner et al. 2010; Allan and Forder 2012). 
Public procurement can also be used to incentivise providers to focus on the quality of their services. 
The public purchaser can increase competition on quality by putting higher weights on predefined 
quality criteria and asking providers to compete on both price and quality. Examples of such schemes 
are found in some areas in England and include a ‘preferred supplier ranked list’, where the 
provider’s position on the list is determined through a quality assessment.  In its extreme, public 
purchasers set both the price and output quantity (for example, care hours provided) and call for 
tenders on quality criteria only. An example for such quality-focused competitions are the tenders for 
stated-funded aged care packages for home and residential care in Australia (Davidson 2011; 
Department of Social Services 2014).  
Table 3: Summary of the forms of economic instruments to promote quality LTC services across selected OECD countries 
                         Direction of implementation 
 
Top-down 
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Type of intervention 
Quality-related subsidies  
e.g. for investments in quality 
infrastructure; for certifications; for 
projects aiming to improve quality 
 
ENG 
(workforce development subsidies) 
Quality-related price regulation, payment 
schemes 
e.g. P4P, mark-ups on reimbursement 
rates for over-fulfilment of standards  
AUT 
(funding linked to adoption of QM schemes) 
 
JPN 
(mark-up on reimbursement)  
AUS 
 (Conditional Adjustment Payment) 
ENG, USA  
(P4P – care homes) 
AUS 
(P4P – care homes & home care) 
 
Quality-related public procurement 
e.g. quality criteria and their weights in 
public procurement 
AUS (call for tenders on quality criteria only possible), 
ENG 
Key: AUT Austria, AUS Australia, ENG England, FIN Finland, JPN Japan, USA America 
3.3 Information-related instruments 
Information instruments are implemented to influence the behaviour of actors “through the transfer 
of knowledge, the communication of reasoned argument, and persuasion” (Bemelmans-Videc 1998: 
11).  We interpret information in its broadest sense here and include four categories of information: 
education and knowledge management; quality management systems; public reporting; and 
feedback on quality from users, staff and other members of the public.  The use of these types of 
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information instruments is illustrated in Table 4.  Although the binding force of information 
instruments is usually relatively low, there are exceptions where they interact with regulatory or 
economic instruments.  
In the six OECD countries, education and knowledge management involves a number of actors, many 
of whom are not formally part of government or operate at arms-length from government.  For 
example, in England, the regulatory standards provide basic guidance on care processes, but these 
are supplemented by guidance on best practice from an arms-length body (the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence) and two independent, but partly government-funded, organisations 
(the Social Care Institute for Excellence, focusing on social care processes, and Skills for Care, 
focusing on the workforce).  For residential care in Australia, education and knowledge management 
are more explicitly embedded in the regulatory system.  The regulator has responsibility for the 
dissemination of best practice approaches alongside its inspection and audit role, which it fulfils by 
holding courses and conferences on continuous improvement and on achieving accreditation 
standards, as well as recognising good quality providers with Best Practice Awards on an annual 
basis.   
Another source of information is advocacy groups which, in addition to campaigning for better care, 
are also active in defining, disseminating and educating providers on best practice, particularly in 
residential care.  Although such groups are found in all countries they are particularly vocal in the 
USA, where several approaches for the redesign and improvement of residential care to achieve 
better quality of life outcomes have emerged under the banner of the ‘culture change movement’ 
(Rahman and Schnelle 2008).   
Quality management systems and quality improvement tools – such as the generic ISO system or the 
care home-specific E-Qalin in Austria – are adopted by providers for a variety of reasons.  Many of 
these tools (e.g. the ISO system) may be considered self-regulation (see section 3.1), however, they 
also act as information-related tools to increase providers’ awareness and skills in monitoring and 
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improving the quality of LTC.  Benchmarking is another way of using information to support quality 
improvement goals. In England, the popularity of benchmarking in public sector organisations and 
the availability of data on social care at the local government level has enabled the emergence of 
‘Adult Social Care Benchmarking Clubs’. These are often run by specialist benchmarking firms who 
assist local commissioners in sharing and comparing performance information, to identify 
opportunities to transfer learning for more effective commissioning and quality monitoring. 
A more recent development is involving users of care and other members of the public in improving 
care provision.  The public reporting of quality information aims to directly address the lack of 
information about quality in LTC markets, which undermines the ability of consumers to make 
effective choices about their care and creates market inefficiencies.  Information on quality is 
available in three different forms (Fung et al. 2007).  The first type is the publication of right-to-know 
information, where users are made aware of compliance with regulatory requirements and major 
provider failings. This is achieved by publicising the outcomes of regulatory inspections and reviews 
for residential care in Australia, and for residential and domiciliary care in England, Japan and the 
USA, with a focus on online information. In Austria only the part of the NQC assessment that covers 
structural indicators and management reports are accessible online. The second type, targeted 
transparency, consists of structured and formally-provided information that sheds light on provider 
quality. The most comprehensive example is Nursing Home Compare and Home Health Compare 
from the USA, which enable the comparison of care home and home health agencies on a range of 
quality indicators derived from the national minimum dataset for providers. There is a less-
developed version in Finland (www.palveluvaaka.fi) and one in development in Australia 
(Department of Health and Ageing 2012). A more recent development is the emergence of a third 
type of information – collaborative transparency policies – where users and other stakeholders 
contribute to the production of published quality information.  In other sectors, users and consumers 
are able to post reviews of products and services on the internet, for example, via sites such as 
TripAdvisor.  In England, the government is actively supporting the development of similar feedback 
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and comparison sites for LTC providers (Trigg 2014).  The end goal of these initiatives is to empower 
the users of care to make informed decisions in selecting providers, although the ability of the frailest 
users of care to act as consumers is questioned (Braithwaite et al. 2007; Eika 2009). 
For instances of very poor care, there are usually more formal two-way channels for users, family and 
staff members to raise concerns about care received.  Top-down regulations normally dictate that 
providers should have complaints processes in place and act as the first port of call for complainants.  
In Australia, England and in each state in the USA, there is a single independent body which deals 
with complaints that are not satisfactorily resolved at the provider (or commissioner in England) 
level; while local bodies are in place in Austria and Finland to resolve complaints.  In Japan the 
escalation process is slightly different: complaints are made first to the care manager and then to the 
LTC insurer.  In all countries there may also be a bottom-up element with providers developing 
complaints systems that go beyond regulatory requirements, for example to achieve certification, 
such as ISO. 
Table 4: Summary of the forms of information interventions to promote quality LTC services across selected OECD 
countries 
Direction of implementation      Top-down Bottom-up 
                                        Binding force 
 
Type of intervention 
High Low High/low 
 
Education and knowledge management 
(excluding professional and clinical staff) 
 
JPN AUS, ENG, FIN, USA AUT, AUS, ENG, FIN, 
USA 
Quality management systems and 
improvement tools 
 AUT, JPN FIN, USA, ENG 
Public reporting    
Publication of inspection reports, 
compliance and sanctions 
AUS, ENG, JPN, 
USA, AUT 
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(partial) 
Provider performance data AUS, USA FIN (partial) FIN 
Collaboratively produced information from 
stakeholders including users 
 ENG  AUS, ENG, USA 
Complaints channels  AUS, AUT, ENG, 
FIN, JPN, USA 
 AUS, AUT, ENG, 
FIN, JPN, USA 
Key: AUT Austria, AUS Australia, ENG England, FIN Finland, JPN Japan, USA America 
4 Critical assessment of policy instruments to promote good quality 
LTC services 
To assess the value of quality-promoting policy instruments it is necessary to view the instruments 
within a wider context.  All quality-promoting instruments sit within a LTC governance regime, which 
structures the relationships between providers and their staff, government and service users.  From 
the point of view of professionals and providers this might be described as the ‘external 
environment’.  External environments will vary between countries and, where responsibilities are 
devolved to lower levels of administration, also within countries.  It is therefore highly likely that 
similar policy instruments will have different effects depending on where they are implemented.  
Provider characteristics will also be important in determining the chances of success of policy 
instruments.  Factors such as the style and effectiveness of the leadership; the organisation’s vision, 
mission and strategy and the level of engagement of stakeholders in the process have been shown to 
be important in determining the success of change activities (see, for example, the model developed 
by Burke and Litwin 1992).  Organisations may have very different goals to government and staff may 
be motivated by a range of factors, both altruistic and self-interested.  It is therefore unlikely that the 
impact of each policy instrument will be uniform across providers or staff.  
The implementation characteristics for each instrument, in particular the binding force, are therefore 
an important factor in understanding the impact of instruments.  Where the binding force is low, we 
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must consider why providers or professionals would adopt the instrument; conversely, where the 
binding force is high, a more important consideration is whether providers and professionals react in 
adverse ways to the instrument. 
The interaction between the different instruments, providers (and their staff) and the external 
environment is shown schematically in Figure 1.  In the following sections we assess the effectiveness 
of regulatory, economic and information instruments paying attention to these relationships.   
Figure 1: Key factors determining the likelihood of successful implementation or adoption of policies to promote formal 
LTC (Provider Characteristics are taken from the model developed by Burke-Litwin (1992)) 
4.1 Assessment of the regulatory context for LTC providers 
The effectiveness of regulation is often considered through the lens of ‘regulatory failure’, describing 
situations in which the regulatory regime fails to have the desired effect.  Causes of regulatory failure 
include resistance to the regulations, regulatory capture (where the regulated bend the regulations 
to meet their needs in place of the needs of those for whom the regulations were designed to 
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protect), ritual compliance (where organisations go through the motions of compliance), lack of data 
(reflecting the difficulty of measuring aspects of quality), and performance ambiguity (reflecting the 
multivalency of performance and quality) (Boyne et al. 2002).   
Partly as a result of measurement problems and performance ambiguity there may be a lack of 
alignment between regulatory goals and the goals of other actors within the LTC system.  For 
example, a regulatory system that focuses on, e.g. workforce characteristics and the use of care 
technologies, implicitly sets these structural requirements as system goals.  This may be appropriate 
if the goal is, for example, to professionalise the workforce (see section 4.2).  However, if the goal of 
policymakers and providers is to improve user outcomes, it is important to demonstrate how the 
structural standards specified promote user outcomes.  Since where standards do not support the 
system goals and are not aligned with providers’ goals they may be a barrier to achieving high quality 
care: providers may resist the regulations, perceiving them as burdensome and pointless; and poorly 
chosen indicators with no relationship to quality have broader system-wide effects such as distorting 
priorities and introducing inefficiencies. 
Yet, evidence about the relationship between structural aspects of quality and user outcomes is in 
most cases either equivocal or absent.  An exception in this regard is staff-to-patient ratios about 
which there is fairly compelling evidence from the US context.  Studies have shown higher staffing 
levels to be positively associated with high quality care in nursing homes (at least when measured 
using clinically-oriented outcome indicators) (Spilsbury et al. 2011), fewer severe deficiency citations 
and an improvement in certain health conditions requiring intensive nursing care (Chen and 
Grabowski 2014).  As a result of this lack of evidence and a concern to better reflect system goals, 
some countries have developed standards that focus on aspects of process or outcome quality. 
However, process- and outcome-focused standards are generally much harder to define and 
measure than structural standards.  Although some aspects, such as the use of restraints, may be 
monitored from care records, many, particularly those associated with quality of life outcomes, 
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require assessment either through observation or interview with the service user.  It is unlikely to be 
by chance then that inspections are used in the USA, which has some process and outcome 
standards, and England and Australia that focus exclusively on outcome and process standards, since 
this method allows the inspector to observe practice and engage with service users. 
Whilst inspections may allow for a more rounded assessment of quality and help to overcome the 
distortion and motivation problems associated with structurally-focused standards, it is an expensive 
and complicated activity, particularly when compared to a desk-based review or audit of documents.  
Inspectors need to be skilled in inspection methods and knowledgeable enough about care practice 
to judge compliance with consistency against what can be quite vaguely-specified standards.  
Evidence from the USA which finds wide variations within and across states in the number of 
deficiency citations demonstrates the problem of inconsistency in interpretation of the regulations 
(Miller and Mor 2006).  Data-based ways of surveying standards that do not involve inspections have 
been attempted, although unsuccessfully to date, in England due to difficulties collecting comparable 
data (see Malley et al. 2014).  In the US inspections are run in parallel with a highly standardised and 
very detailed data collection and quarterly reporting scheme (Stevenson and Bramson 2014).  It 
seems likely that process and outcome standards lead to higher surveillance costs and variability in 
the assessment of compliance with standards.  
Enforcing regulation also raises challenges.  Regulation scholars have proposed that regulators adopt 
a ‘responsive regulation’ approach to enforcement, which takes compliance through persuasion and 
education as its starting point (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992).  Underpinning this approach is the 
recognition that providers are motivated by a wide range of factors.  Penalties and deterrence 
activity assume that providers are largely self-interested, potentially inducing ‘resistance’ to the 
regulations and crowding out more ‘knightly’ altruistic motivations (Le Grand 2003).  However, 
compliance through persuasion and education as a strategy on its own assumes that providers are 
largely knights, thus suffering conversely from problems of gaming and falsification where providers 
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are in fact self-interested ‘knaves’.  For this reason, enforcement strategies must incorporate strong 
sanctions and deterrence to deal with the self-interested knaves (Braithwaite et al. 2007).   
In practice, in countries that follow the responsive regulation approach, achieving such a balance is a 
challenge.  Whereas the USA regulator focuses, on paper at least, on detecting and enforcing 
compliance, the Australian regulator and its quality assessors explicitly have a dual quality 
improvement and enforcement role.  Some commentators complain that this has led to a tension 
and blurring of roles, which undermines the regulator’s effectiveness (Commonwealth of Australia 
2007).  Thus many countries seem to have come to the conclusion that regulation is not a silver 
bullet, but one part of the solution.  Regulatory approaches based on controlling quality through 
inspection and enforcement need to be supported by other mechanisms, including self-regulation, 
quality management based on self-assessment or third-party certification (Leichsenring et al. 2014b), 
and data-based public reporting (Leone et al. 2014), all of which have gained importance in recent 
years. 
4.2  Assessment of the regulatory context for LTC professionals and 
workers 
The main aim of regulation aimed at the workforce is to ensure that workers have the right skills, 
experience and up-to-date knowledge.  In countries, such as Finland, Austria and Japan, that heavily 
regulate the workforce, this is explicitly associated with the goal of professionalisation (see Leone et 
al. 2014).  Japan is particularly interesting in this respect since care workers have distinct 
qualifications and, highly unusually compared to other countries, many obtain their qualifications 
following a four-year university programme.  Commentators speculate that it is for this reason that 
care workers have a relatively high status and are paid above the minimum (Ikegami et al. 2014).  
Professionalisation may therefore be one important component of improving the status of care work, 
which is important for a growing industry already suffering from recruitment and retention problems 
(Fujisawa and Colombo 2009; Colombo et al. 2011).   
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However, a highly professionalised workforce is likely to be a more expensive workforce.  More 
expensive workers, such as nurses, may be displaced by less expensive or unqualified workers, where 
substitution is possible.  (Although this may not have negative consequences for the quality of care, 
see e.g. Chen and Grabowski 2014).  Ikegami et al (2014)  suggest that the reason nursing agencies in 
Japan have not expanded as fast as home helper agencies is because nurses are three times as 
expensive as care workers.  Indeed in England there has been a debate for some time about 
introducing registration requirements for care workers, but one argument against this has been the 
effect this would have on the cost of care, which is already considered unaffordable for some people.  
There is a concern that, unable to afford the wages of professional care workers from home care 
agencies, people may turn in larger numbers to the grey ‘unregulated’ market.  In the long-term 
substitution would affect demand for professionals, and would likely lead to low take-up of training 
by workers, thus undermining the goal of professionalisation.   
Professionalisation of the workforce therefore requires strict regulation of roles for different 
professions and policing of the market to ensure there is not ‘inappropriate’ substitution. In this 
respect, one challenging issue that has emerged in many European countries, particularly those with 
certain types of care regimes (cash-for care regimes, substantial co-payments for home care services 
and an undersupply of home care services that oversee the dependent person for half a day and 
longer) and access to relatively cheap labour in Central and Eastern European countries, is a growth 
of (illegal) migrant care in private households (Österle and Bauer 2012). Many people hire 
unqualified immigrants although this practice is often illegal.  For example, in Austria, to protect the 
goal of professionalisation and also to prevent dependent people from being sued for illegally 
employing migrant care workers, migrant care work was regularised in 2007 by introducing, among 
other things, some qualification requirements and restrictions around care tasks to be conducted by 
migrant care workers in private households (Österle and Bauer 2012; Trukeschitz and Schneider 
2012). The problem was therefore resolved by creating a new type of care worker.   
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4.3 Assessment of economic incentives to improve the quality of LTC 
services 
Although economic incentives are used across a number of countries, very little is written about the 
effectiveness of individual schemes in promoting quality, although one type of scheme, P4P, has 
received a lot of attention.  The evidence for its effectiveness is limited and interpreting the findings 
is complicated by the diversity of ways in which P4P schemes have been implemented (Briesacher et 
al. 2009).  Much of the debate about P4P is focused on the way providers (or staff) may react to such 
schemes and the potential for negative consequences. 
A variety of negative consequences have been identified. There is the potential for providers to focus 
on the aspects of quality that are measured, and on which the additional payments are allocated, at 
the expense of other aspects of quality. There are also concerns about the accuracy of performance 
measures, where they are collected by providers, since they may seek to manipulate or game the 
data to get a higher payment.  Independent collection of the data may not necessarily overcome this 
problem as agents of independent organisations may be susceptible to bribes or inducements, thus 
requiring additional layers of regulation to assure the standards of independent data collection 
organisations.  Providers may also engage in ‘cream-skimming’, where they select people who are 
easier to care for to make their performance appear better.  All of these adverse consequences have 
yet to be researched in the context of P4P schemes and more information about whether, and the 
circumstances under which, they occur is necessary for P4P schemes to be evaluated (Konetzka and 
Werner 2010).   
A further issue with the use of P4P to reward ‘good’ performance is that it can redistribute funds 
from badly-performing providers to good providers.  Commissioners generally have a set budget to 
use to pay for LTC services.  Unless additional funds are identified and ring-fenced to finance P4P 
schemes, then funds for the scheme will be deducted from the general budget, thus reducing the 
money available to pay providers their basic fees.  This in effect diverts money to good performers, 
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and could further undermine the ability of poor providers to improve, potentially hastening their exit 
from the market.   
Finally, P4P mechanisms build on measurable LTC characteristics and aim to reward good quality LTC 
provision. This may be considered a good thing, since it improves market efficiency.  However, 
particularly in the case of care homes, it may be viewed more negatively since relocation to a new 
home is a stressful event which potentially leads to poorer health outcomes and increased risk of 
mortality, although the evidence is equivocal (Jolley et al. 2011; Holder and Jolley 2012).  A scheme 
that increased the number of care home providers exiting from the market may therefore, 
paradoxically, lead to worse outcomes for users.     
4.4 Assessment of information tools to support LTC quality improvement 
Underpinning the success of many information instruments, particularly quality management 
systems, is the rate of adoption by providers.  It is perhaps for this reason that adoption of a quality 
management system is often embedded within regulations. For example, in Australia, providers have 
to show that their management processes and practices support continuous improvement to gain 
accreditation.  Yet in the absence of a legislative imperative there is still extensive use of 
benchmarking, accreditation and associated quality management systems across countries.  In 
addition, there are grass-roots movements, such as the culture change movement and the provider-
led adoption of the resident assessment instrument (RAI) in Japan.   
Many providers seem to participate in quality programmes to signal quality in a competitive market.  
Indeed, branding appears to be increasingly important, with institutions allied to culture change 
programmes using their care philosophy as a selling point.  In England established companies from 
other sectors use their brand position when entering the LTC market.  What is interesting is that even 
in countries with relatively low levels of service competition, such as Austria and Finland, there is still 
a desire on the part of providers to signal quality through participation in accreditation schemes.  It is 
possible that this is a strategic response to what is in all countries a growing and evolving market, 
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with many countries increasingly allowing entry from private providers. This development may 
equally be rooted in care worker shortages and the attempts of providers to attract skilled care 
workers.  
Nationwide quality certification systems, which are voluntary by nature, may have other benefits, 
helping to establish uniform quality standards and overcome fragmented quality regulation in a 
federalised system.  An example is the development of the National Quality Certificate (NQC) for care 
homes in Austria.  The development of the NQC is noteworthy since Austria is characterised by 
regional autonomy in standard-setting and currently focuses on structural indicators. The NQC 
defines nationwide standards and whilst recognising the predominance of structural indicators it also 
draws attention to both process and outcome indicators. Although there is room for improvement 
this example shows that uniform quality standards can evolve even in a decentralised governance 
system.   
Other facets of the LTC system, particularly the regulatory environment, can thwart the adoption of 
some voluntary measures.  In the USA, the emphasis of the culture change movement on quality of 
life is often in conflict with regulatory measures, which are preoccupied with minimising risk for users 
and can inadvertently sabotage improvement efforts.  For example, the Eden Alternative model for 
residential care for older people involves developing more homelike and stimulating environments 
with, for example, soft furnishings and pets. The regulator itself has recognised the difficulties posed 
by its highly prescriptive requirements in environmental design, and training and information has 
been developed for providers to show them how to negotiate their way through regulatory 
requirements to implement culture change initiatives (Miller et al. 2010).  
In addition to impeding quality-promoting efforts, regulations may be difficult to follow.  Although 
standards are often intended to provide guidance to providers on how to deliver quality services, 
they may carry with them varying levels of clarity about what is required at an operational level to 
deliver the required level of quality or to improve quality over and above minimum standards.  It is 
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common for other knowledge and education instruments to be developed by a variety of 
independent and government organisations to supplement standards.  It may be challenging for 
providers, who may be small and lack resources to interpret and integrate information from a variety 
of sources.  Organisations dedicated to supporting providers to change, such as the Quality 
Improvement Organisations in the USA or from the culture change movement, could be of value.  
While many governments are developing public reporting schemes, their effects are generally poorly 
understood.  In particular, the mechanism through which public reporting schemes have their effect 
is unclear.  Berwick et al (2003) suggested that public reporting might have its effect through either a 
‘change’ or ‘selection’ pathway.  The change pathway works through market position or reputation, 
where providers are shamed into improving quality to ensure they remain competitive; whereas the 
selection pathway works through allowing people to make better choices about their care.  
Interestingly, the evidence from the USA, and England to a lesser extent, provides more support for 
the change rather than the selection pathway.  Thus Mukamel et al (2007) find that nursing homes in 
the USA examine their report cards to address failures.  While there appears to be low awareness 
and usage of reports among users (Castle 2009; Commission for Social Care Inspection 2009; Office of 
Fair Trading 2011), reports may be used more widely by professionals and intermediaries in 
supporting older people to select providers (Shugarman and Brown 2006; Commission for Social Care 
Inspection 2009).  Despite more evidence for the change pathway, new policies tend to emphasise 
the publication – usually online – of quality information to assist users to make choices, either 
consisting of data generated by providers and regulators (Australia) or reviews generated by users 
themselves (England). 
Several issues have to be solved to ensure that publication of quality information can be used 
effectively to support decision-making.  Users and their carers may not be using the quality 
information for valid reasons.  All too often, LTC is a ‘stress’ purchase made under difficult 
circumstances.  This is particularly the case for residential care where users are often seeking care 
following hospitalisation (Bebbington et al. 2001; Castle 2003).  Several problems compound this 
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issue. The quality information available may not reflect what matters to service users, who may be 
more interested in the experiences of other users and carers; the user surveys in England and Finland 
are a step in this direction.  Users of LTC have many difficulties interpreting data and quality 
information (Vaiana and McGlynn 2002; Gerteis et al. 2007) and older people and those with 
disabilities are the groups that are least likely to have access to the internet (Dutton and Blank 2011; 
Fox 2011).  Overcoming these problems is critical for quality information to be of real value as an aid 
to consumer choice. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether the intended audience for the information is capable and 
motivated to use it, publicly-reported quality information of all types may fail because of other 
implementation challenges.  For example, user-produced reviews might be compromised by 
challenges in generating sufficient reviews, by whether reviews are genuine, and by issues associated 
with the confidentiality and anonymity of both users and staff  (Trigg 2014).  Issues around 
confidentiality and anonymity also hamper the effectiveness of complaints and whistle-blowing 
channels, with the fear of retribution or hostility seen to be a disincentive for the reporting of cases 
of abuse and neglect (Australian National Audit Office 2012; Healthwatch 2014); and better 
processes are seen as important (Cooper et al. 2008).  In addition, the competitiveness of markets is 
important in determining the effectiveness of the public reporting of quality, as predicted by theory 
(Grabowski and Town 2011).   
How quality is measured is also a challenge for public reporting.  Information reporting systems can 
only report on certain aspects of quality and unreported aspects of quality may suffer at the expense 
of reported aspects.  Although opinion in the USA based on the evidence from various studies is that 
public reporting has a modestly positive impact on the quality of care delivered (Konetzka and 
Werner 2010), research has been limited to the effect on clinical quality indicators.  Aspects of 
quality of life and user experience were not assessed.  As Netten and colleagues (2012) show, the 
relationship between quality of life outcomes for service users and other quality indicators may not 
be straightforward.  They found that the care home providers with better star ratings, where the star 
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rating derived from inspection activity, were not necessarily always those with better quality of life 
outcomes for service users.  In addition, although Werner et al (2009) found that unreported aspects 
of clinical quality improved in US nursing homes, the improvements were less than those for 
reported aspects, indicating that providers do focus on what is measured to some extent.  The mix of 
indicators is also important to reduce the risk that providers will indulge in cream-skimming, as 
observed on an albeit limited basis by Mukamel et al (2009).  Together these studies illustrate that, 
although a focus on certain aspects of quality may not completely crowd out improvement on other 
aspects of quality, high quality on one dimension does not necessarily lead to high quality on another 
dimension, and resources may become concentrated on the reported aspects of quality.  
Consequently the choice of indicators to report is important since a poorly chosen indicator can 
unfairly reward or penalise organisations, and may affect the efficiency of the market.  
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the variation across countries in their efforts to promote LTC quality. We 
framed our analysis by distinguishing between regulatory, economic and information-related 
instruments. Even at this very general level, different policy styles could be identified, with countries 
relying more or less on information-related or economic tools in addition to regulatory approaches; 
putting different emphasis on regulating the workforce, providers or protecting consumers; and 
varying in the regulatory methods, degree of enforcement and types of standards employed.  Some 
analysts have seen in the combinations of instruments adopted a certain degree of path dependence, 
with the direction of travel moving from regulatory controls, to the standardisation of care practices, 
and finally stimulating quality through market-based incentives and competition (Murakami and 
Colombo 2013a); while others see evolution in terms of selective borrowing and adaptation of 
elements from other regimes (Bode and Champetier 2012).  Whichever explanation comes closest to 
the truth, it is certain that the degree of variation observed means there should be ample room for 
countries to draw upon and learn from the experiences of others.       
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However, learning from other countries’ experiences is complicated by the variety of ways in which 
LTC systems are organised.  For example, many of the information and economic instruments we 
identified work by increasing competition on quality and therefore rely on competitive markets for 
services.  The competitiveness of markets varies, however, both within countries, due to differences 
in local conditions, and between countries, due to political choices over the extent of marketisation.  
It is therefore very likely that the effectiveness of instruments will vary according to the external 
environment or LTC system.  Thus, although countries vary in their use of the spectrum of 
information and economic instruments available, suggesting that there is room for countries to 
develop their approaches to quality promotion, the effectiveness of these policies may be limited by 
the features of the LTC market.  Some ‘competition-based’ policies, such as public reporting may 
have other benefits, such as promoting transparency and generating trust, but this is not always the 
case.  When designing policies to promote quality it is important that governments, or other actors, 
consider the full range of tools at their disposal and analyse carefully the interdependencies between 
other aspects of governance and quality-promoting instruments.   
The multiple types of instruments act in different ways upon providers and give policymakers a 
variety of tools to guide the behaviour of people and organisations within the LTC system.  However, 
the impact of each type of instrument is unlikely be uniform across providers.  The complexities 
faced by organisations attempting to make either incremental improvements or transformational 
changes are described in an extensive body of literature on change management and organisational 
development (see, for example, Burnes 2009). As well as the motivation of the provider organisation 
and its staff, which we have considered here, the capacity of the organisation to respond will also be 
influenced strongly by characteristics such as the skills of its leadership, the structure of the 
organisation and its existing processes and systems.  The predisposition of the provider to the 
adoption of innovations – whether technological or otherwise – will also influence how quickly and 
enthusiastically the provider adopts new ideas about the delivery of care (Rogers 2003).  In addition 
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to the design features of the instruments, the characteristics and nuances of organisations are 
therefore important to consider when analysing the likely chances of success of instruments.   
A further challenge for policymakers is the lack of evidence over the relative costs and benefits of 
quality-promoting instruments, which compromises their ability to make strategic decisions 
regarding which instruments to implement. For example, evidence about the effects of regulatory 
instruments is particularly weak, yet regulation is relied upon more extensively than other 
instruments (Murakami and Colombo 2013a).  Equally, evidence about the value of instruments that 
focus on professionalising the workforce is poor.  However, a number of countries choose this route 
to quality improvement despite the fact that investing in the workforce is likely to increase labour 
costs and therefore the overall cost of providing care, since labour costs are the vast majority of costs 
for organisations.  Currently this choice seems to be informed more by the particular political and 
social history of a country than evidence as to the value of such an approach.  Indeed such a policy 
would be difficult to sell to organisations struggling with cash flow or profitability issues, particularly 
since the cost premium cannot be offset by reducing staffing ratios – staff may be highly motivated 
and skilled, but that will not matter if they are unable to devote sufficient time to service users to 
ensure high quality care is provided.  Interventions that facilitate immediate reductions in (or 
maintain) staffing costs are likely to be the most appealing for providers and cash-strapped 
governments, even if, in the long-run, their benefits are small in comparison to the benefits of 
investing in staff.  Research providing an evidence base for the social and economic value of different 
types of instruments will be invaluable in this regard.    
Measuring LTC quality adequately is a key issue for quality-promoting policies since the success of 
most instruments depends on reliable quality measurement. As we have shown many problems are 
associated with the choice of measure and how quality is measured. First, structural indicators, such 
as room size, staffing ratios, education levels, still dominate in the OECD countries. As making an 
informed choice between quality measures is far from trivial, it seems some public authorities stick 
to measuring what they are legally required to rather than investing in wholesale redesign of quality 
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measurement systems.  While, a small number of countries have invested in the development of 
process and outcome indicators – to reflect the continuous and long-term nature of LTC by the way 
care is delivered (care processes) and how the care provided relates to the purpose of the 
intervention (care outcomes) – these systems are still a work-in-progress. Second, as the quality of 
LTC cannot be measured in every detail, public and private purchasers rely, to some extent, on the 
intrinsic motivation of the LTC provider. Quality assessments that come with what is perceived to be 
irrelevant data collection or too much burdensome paperwork for care workers might crowd out 
such intrinsic motivation, leading to undesired and unintended results. Finally, the choice of 
measures needs to reflect what is important to care recipients. While the service user’s or care 
recipient’s perspective is very important in other industries, it seems to be in its infancy in LTC as 
quality is often defined from an expert’s perspective (providers, care workers, public authorities). As 
LTC can be considered as an experience good, user experience measures should have more 
importance in quality measurement frameworks. Although service user satisfaction surveys are quite 
common, they often do not measure the care recipient’s quality of life.  Measures such as ASCOT7 
are leading the way in measuring quality of life in this area, but there needs to be more work to 
understand how experience measures can and should be used to direct or stimulate quality 
promotion.  
Space did not permit us to expand upon two important aspects, which we mention here.  The first is 
that a wide variety of actors were involved in quality promotion efforts within countries.  Actors 
included public authorities at all levels of government from the local, through regional levels to the 
national as well as arms-length bodies and more independent organisations.  However, the extent of 
involvement of these actors and the roles they perform differed between countries.  Understanding 
the reasons for this variation as well as the consequences for the success of policies to promote 
quality would be an interesting and valuable direction for future research.  The second area is quality 
of informal care.  Given that LTC provided by family members and friends is still the most important 
                                                             
7
 ASCOT (Adult Social Care Outcomes Toolkit) http://www.pssru.ac.uk/ascot/ (derived 21 Nov. 2012) 
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resource for dependent people, policies to promote the quality of informal LTC could play a crucial 
role in improving LTC quality more generally. Interestingly, the political debates about LTC quality 
mainly address professional LTC provision. Informal care policies still primarily aim to support family 
members to care for their loved ones (Schneider et al. forthcoming) rather than enhance quality of 
informal care. Only a few countries have also developed programmes to assure the quality of 
informal care in private households. These home visit and counselling programmes differ in their 
design and coverage. More systematic analysis is needed to map different policy options for 
promoting quality of informal care and their impact on both maintaining the health and functional 
status and the quality of life of people in need of LTC.  
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